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Abstract
In this paper we use simulations to numerically evaluate the Hybrid DEA -
Second Score Auction. In a procurement setting, the winner of the Hybrid auction
by design receives payment at the most equal to the Second Score auction. It is
therefore superior to the traditional Second Score scheme from the point of view
of a principal interested in acquiring an item at the minimum price without losing
in quality. For a set of parameters we quantify the size of the improvements and
show that the improvement depends intimately on the regularity imposed on the
underlying cost function. In the least structured case of a variable returns to scale
technology, the hybrid auction only improved the outcome for a small percentage of
cases. For other technologies with constant returns to scale, the gains are consider-
ably higher and payments are lowered in a large percentage of cases. We also show
that the number of the participating agents, the concavity of the principal value
functions, and the number of quality dimensions impact the expected payment.
1 Introduction
Multi-dimensional auction mechanisms select winners based on a multiplicity of factors
in addition to price (cost). They have therefore been widely used in public procurement.
For example, in a contract for a construction project, the price (budget) of the project is
obviously important, but so is the design of the construction, the quality of the materials,
and the effects on the environment, and it is often not possible for the procurer to specify
these dimensions in all details beforehand.
In his seminal paper, Che [4] designed a series of auctions for such settings. They
allow a procurer to balance the economic value from different designs or qualities and
the corresponding cost. However, Che assumed that there are no correlations among
the participants’ costs of providing the different qualities. This is clearly unrealistic in
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many applications, specifically when those participating in the auction belong in the same
industry or share the same resources. If cost correlations are not exploited, the cost to
the procurer increases. Given the amount of funds involved in procurement (e.g. public
procurement accounts for 16% of EU GDP [5]) lowering the costs by exploiting such costs
affiliations is very important.
The DEA - Second Score Hybrid auction introduced in the article entitled ’DEA based
auctions’ [1]1 does exactly that. It assumes some structure on the underlaying costs, and
is hereby able to lower the expected costs to the procurer compared to Cher’s Second
Score Auction (SSA). The Hybrid auction shares the properties of being individually
rational, incentive compatible and socially optimal (allocatively efficient) with the SSA,
and at the same time, it may lower the costs to the procuring principal. The size of the
cost improvements, however, has never been quantified.
In this paper, we therefore introduce a framework that allows us to simulation such
auctions and to quantify the cost improvements by comparing the payment in the Hy-
brid auction to that of the Second Score auction. Moreover, we examine how payments
are affected by the assumed cost regularities, the number of agents participating in the
auctions, the concavity of the principal’s value function, and the number of quality di-
mensions involved.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we analyze the DEA -
Second Score Hybrid auction. In Section 3 we introduce the simulation framework and in
Section 4 we present the numerical results. Finally in Section 5 we analyze our findings
and draw conclusions
2 The DEA - Second Score Hybrid Auction
We consider a setting where different agents can produce different outputs, which can
specify the design, the quality of materials used, the environmental impact etc., at costs
which are consistent with some underlying but unknown cost function. This cost function
belongs to a broad class of cost functions, e.g. the set of all increasing and convex cost
functions.
The Hybrid auction works by first assigning scores to the cost-output bids submitted
by the agents. These scores are used to identify the agent with the highest potential to
contribute to social welfare. That agent wins the auction and is paid the minimum of the
second-score payment and the DEA yardstick cost, based solely on the bids from other
bidders.
To formalize, let us introduce a minimum of notation2. Let the set of bidders be
I = {1, ..., n}, the output profile offered by bidder i denoted as yi and its possibly
manipulated cost as xi. The value function, V (yi), measures the principal’s benefit
from different output profiles, and is increasing and concave in yi. Lastly, the Data
Envelopment Analysis estimated cost function which is based on all bids but the bid of
1Other DEA based approaches in procurement and more recent literature on the subject can be found
in [6]
2Detailed notation and explanation behind the theory can be found in [1, 2]
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the Hybrid auction using VRS technology.
bidder i is defined as follows:
CDEA−i(y; k) = min{
∑
j∈I,j 6=i
λjxj : y ≤
∑
j∈I,j 6=i
λjyj, λ ∈ Λn−1(k) } (1)
where k represents the specific DEA model. If the underlying production technology
has variable returns to scale, k = VRS, we have Λn−1(V RS) = {λ ∈ Rn−10 |
∑
j∈I,j 6=i λ
j =
1}. If the underlying technology is a constant returns to scale technology, k = CRS and
Λn−1(CRS) = Rn−10 .
With these definitions, the The DEA - Second Score Hybrid auction can be formalized
as follows:
Step 1: The bidders submit price-output bids (xi, yi), i ∈ I.
Step 2: Each bid is assigned a score Si = S(xi, yi) = V (yi)− xi, i ∈ I.
Step 3: The bid with the highest score wins, i.e. ignoring ties, the project is allocated to
agent i when Si = S(1)
Step 4: The winner i is compensated with
bi(x, y) = min{CDEA−i(yi; k), V (yi)− S(2)}
and losers are not compensated
In this outline, S(1) is the highest value of Si, i ∈ I and S(2) is the second highest value
of Si, i ∈ I
The winner of the auction, as illustrated in Figure 1, is agent 1 and his payment is the
minimum of the second score payment V (yi)−S(2), and the DEA payment CDEA−i(yi; k).
Assuming a VRS technology, the DEA payment is found as a convex combination of
agents’ 2 and 3 bids, and it leads to the smallest payment in this case.
Like in the second score auction an agent’s bid affects its chance of being selected, but
not the compensation when it is selected. This is the key to the incentive compatibility.
In addition to this, the use of benchmarking undermines the bidders’ advantage of having
private cost information. Through the use of a DEA model the equivalent of a second
price outcome can be determined in contexts where the service bundles (i.e. the qualities
or the outputs yi) offered by the different bidders are not entirely similar.
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3 Simulation Framework
Based on the Hybrid auction described in the previous section we now introduce the
simulation framework. We consider a scenario in which the principal’s value function is
given by V (y) = 4(1 − e−αy). This particular value function3 not only is increasing and
concave as required, but it also has a constant Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk
aversion r(y) = −V ′′(y)/V ′(y) = α, with α > 0. The Arrow-Pratt coefficient[7] is a mea-
sure for the principal’s risk-aversion, with a high value corresponding to an increasingly
risk-averse principal whose value function is more convex (curved). Furthermore, the
agents’ cost function is assumed to be x(y) = cy2 in the VRS technology simulations and
x(y) = cy in the CRS technology simulations. Note that the cost functions are consistent
with the axioms of the DEA technologies, cf. e.g. [1, 2]. The parameter c represents
the agents’ private information of their common unit costs and is drawn from the uni-
form distribution U(0, 1). Lastly, the output (quality) level y, is drawn from the uniform
distribution U(0, 2). In a given iteration, all agents face an underlying cost function of
the same form, but their output levels and cost parameters differ. We will introduce
multi-dimensional generalizations below.
We always simulate the process of the mechanism 104 times. In every iteration we
simulate the agents’ costs and qualities (randomly drawn c and y), perform the selection
of the agent with the highest score and record the payment it receives for Hybrid auc-
tions using the VRS, and CRS DEA technologies and the second score auction. Due to
the number of iterations we perform, the standard error in the mean values plotted is
smaller than the symbol size in the plot (less than 10−3) and thus we omit it for clarity.
Technically, all simulations are done in R and all DEA programs are solved using the
”Benchmarking” package for R, cf. [2] and [3]
Our simulations can be grouped in two sets. In the first set (Figures 2 and 3) we
examine how the concavity of the principal’s value function affects the winner’s payment.
In the second set (Figure 4) we consider multi-dimensional output (qualities). In both
sets we explore how sensitive the payments are to the number of agents (from 3 to 60)
participating in the auction.
4 Simulation Results
Having detailed the simulation’s input parameters and objectives, we now present our
numerical findings. The most notable result for both cases (single and multi-dimensional
qualities) is that the expected payment for the winning agent depends intimately on the
assumed regularity of the underlying cost function. With the least ex ante assumptions,
i.e. in the Hybrid VRS auction, the payment is the same or almost identical to the second
score auction. For the Hybrid CRS auction however, the payment is significantly less than
the second score auction. This can be seen in Figures 2 and 3 (Plots a and b) for the
single-dimensional quality case and in Figure 4 (Plots a and b) for the multi-dimension
quality case. In the following sections we look at each case in greater detail and provide
the intuition behind the main result.
3Mas-Collel et. al suggest the use of u(y) = −αe−αy + β (Example 6.C.4). In our scenario we set
b = 4 so that the agents’ score V (y)− x(y) is positive for the range of costs and qualities we consider.
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Figure 2: Single dimensional qualities for n = {3, ..., 60} agents, α = 1, c ∼ U(0, 1), and
y ∼ U(0, 2).
4.1 Single-dimension output
Initially we fix the concavity of the principal’s value function by α = 1 and compare the
payment the winner expects to derive in the Hybrid auction (min{CDEA−i(yi; k), V (yi)−
S(2)}) with the second score auction (V (yi) − S(2)) as the number of agents increases
from 3 to 60. First, we use VRS technology (k=VRS) and simulate the costs using a
quadratic cost function x(y) = cy2. Next, we use the CRS technology (k=CRS), with
costs being simulated by a linear cost function x(y) = cy. We see that as the number of
agents increases the winner’s average Hybrid VRS payment is almost equal to the second
score auction payment (Figure 2 : Plot a), with the ratio between Hybrid VRS and SSA
ranging from 0.98 to 0.99. For the linear cost counterparts, the Hybrid CRS payment
is significantly lower than the expected payment in the second score auction (Figure 2:
Plot b) with the ratio ranging from 0.6 to 0.27.
We proceed to study the Hybrid VRS auction in more detail. We see (Figure 2 : Plot
c) that for 82.9% to 92.25% of the iterations of the algorithm, the second score payment
V (yi)−S(2) is lower than the DEA VRS payment CDEA−i(yi;V RS). This result suggests
that for the VRS technology the Hybrid’s DEA part has a small impact, which is further
decreased as the number of participating agents increases. In the case of CRS, the result
is opposite. The percentage of cases whereby the second score payment is lower than the
DEA CRS payment decreases from 39.6% to 15.2% as the number of agents increases to
60 (Figure 2 : Plot d). This suggests that the impact of the Hybrid Auction is much
more significant for the CRS technology. In addition to this, the simulations showed
that for the VRS technology the so-called hyper-efficiency problem, cf. [1, 2], i.e. the
possibility of DEA being unable to provide a cost norm, has no significant effects despite
its dominance in the cases with few agents (in 53.45% and 42.60% of the cases for 3 and
4 agents the winner is hyper-efficient and this happens for 8.54% of the iterations with
60 agents).
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Figure 3: Single dimensional qualities for α = {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1, 1.4, 1.8, 2.4...5} and
n = 60 agents.
For the second part of these simulations we fix the number of participating agents
to 60 and begin to examine the dependence of the expected payments on the concavity
of the principal’s value function. We measure the concavity, based on the Arrow-Pratt
coefficient which for the particular value function used is equal to α. We follow an
identical process by plotting the expected payments for the winners of both the VRS and
the CRS Hybrid auctions and second score auctions (Figure 3: Plots a and b) for α in
{0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1, 1.4, 1.8, 2.4...5} and then the percentage of iterations where the
second score payment is lower than the DEA VRS and CRS payments (Figure 3: Plots
c and d).
As before, we see (Figure 3 : Plot a and b) that the average Hybrid VRS payment is
very close to the second score auction payment, while for linear costs, the average SSA
payment is again higher than the average Hybrid CRS payment. However, as opposed to
previous simulations, there is a clear indication that as α increases, average Hybrid VRS
payment is in-fact less than the average second score payment. The intuition behind this
result, is that as the principal’s risk aversion increases, the utility function becomes more
and more curved. Consequently, the score function gets less power since it will tend to
envelop the points less closely. A secondary result is that all (Second Score and both
Hybrid auctions) average payments decrease as the parameter α increases for α >= 0.7.
This is to be expected, since a heavy risk averse principal (high value of parameter α),
will favor lower qualities which result in lower payments.
Finally regarding the occurrence of cases in which the SSA payment is less than the
DEA payment, for the VRS technology there is an almost linear decrease as the parameter
α increases (Figure 3 : Plot c), while the opposite happens as the CRS DEA payment
increases as the parameter increases (Figure 3 : Plot d).
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Figure 4: Multi dimensional qualities for n = {3, ..., 60} agents, α1 = α2 = α3 = 1 and
c1, c2, c3 ∼ U(0, 1).
4.2 Multi-dimensional output
In this set of simulations we consider three dimensional qualities. We therefore adjust the
principal’s value function to V (y) = 4(3 − ea1y1 − ea2y2 − ea3y3) with y1, y2, y3 ∼ U(0, 2).
Likewise, we adjust the agents’ cost functions to x(y) = c1y
2
1 +c2y
2
2 +c3y
2
3 in the quadratic
case and to x(y) = c1y1 + c2y2 + c3y3 in the linear case, with c1, c2, c3 ∈ (0, 1].
Again, we calculate the payment the winner gets in the Second Score auction and
the Hybrid VRS and CRS auctions (Figure 4 : Plot a and b), with the number of
the participating agents varying from 3 to 60. In terms of the ordering of the average
payments the results are similar to the case on one dimensional quality. In addition to
that, the appearance of a hyper-efficient winner almost follows the pattern of the single-
dimensional simulations i.e. for the Hybrid VRS there is a hyper-efficient winner in 87.5%
and 81.9% of the iterations for 3 and 4 agents and in 33.8% of the iterations for 60 agents.
In the single-dimension counterparts the occurrences of the cases where the SSA
payment is lower than the DEA VRS payment decreased monotonically with the number
of agents. In the multiple dimension case, this does not happen in the VRS case (Figure
4 : Plot c) but in the CRS case it does still holds (Figure 4 : Plot d).
Finally, for any auction the expected payment to the winner is higher in the multi-
dimensional case than in the single-dimensional case. Indeed, the introduction of 3 di-
mensions results in an increase of the average payments with a factor 2.5 to 7.4 depending
on the number of agents and the use of a VRS or CRS technology.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
To sum up, we have shown that for both single and multi dimensional qualities, the
use of a combination of benchmarking and second score thinking lowers the expected
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payment to the providers, and more so, the stronger assumptions (linear, quadratic) we
impose on the underlying cost function. The VRS DEA technology provides a relatively
small decrease in the principal’s payment compared to a Second Score multi-dimensional
auction. On the contrary, in a CRS technology, the improvements are sizable.
In addition to that, we showed that the ability of the score function to limit payments
to the provider depends on the concavity of the score function. As the principal’s utility
function gets more concave, i.e. as he gets more risk averse with a higher value of α, the
role of the DEA benchmarks becomes more important. The intuition is that the more
curved score function gives a score based approximation more similar to the the so-called
DEA FDH model where we only impose free disposability of inputs and outputs.
We also showed how the number of bidding agents impact the outcome. In general,
more agents will make both the SSA and the DEA based payments lower. In particular
for a low number of bidders, extra bidders will have a large marginal impact on the
payments. This suggests that the procuring principal should make an effort to engage
more bidders.
Lastly, we showed that the introduction of additional output (quality) dimensions
significantly increases the expected payment. We are aware that this may not be a
surprising result since now the average costs and principal’s value function are higher
since three outputs are produced. However, this increase can be also be attributed to
fact than now the ability of DEA to approximate the cost function and the power of
the the second score principle to limit the payments are both undermined by the extra
dimensions. That is, with more dimensions quite a few extra bidders are needed in order
to span the cost function with a given precision. This suggests that the principal should
think carefully on which qualities really matter with an attempt to limit these effects.
Future work should extend the Hybrid DEA auction in different ways. In particular,
from an applied perspective, it seems worthwhile to consider the cases of multiple winners
and multiple bids from each agent. For both cases it remains to be seen whether the eco-
nomic properties of the Hybrid DEA auction (i.e. incentive compatibility and individual
rationality) can be maintained. Also, it will be useful to investigate through simulations
how such extended mechanisms perform with respect to the parameters introduced in
this paper i.e. DEA technologies, number of agents, value function concavity and output
dimensions.
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